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Abstract 
Recent trends of financial distress for non-profit hospitals and the uptick in 
acquisition of these hospitals by for-profit entities indicate different focuses from the 
management of each type of hospital. Using data on hospital quality and basic financial 
measures, this study examines shift in the balance of financial and quality performance. 
The dataset focuses on private non-profit and for-profit hospitals with low bed counts, 
ranging from 50-200 total beds. Results indicate a positive relationship between for-profit 
status and basic financial performance measures, such as profitability, and a negative 
relationship with patient experience, cost reduction for the patient, and overall quality. 
This signals a tradeoff between financial performance and quality, especially measures 
relating to the customer. For-profit hospital management places more of an emphasis on 
the financial performance while non-profit hospital management demonstrates a balance 
between financial performance and high quality performance. Without being involved in 
hospital management decision-making, examining hospital outcomes is the best way to 
give insight into how hospital management is shifts performance priorities by different 
types of ownership. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
In this study, I examine the relationship between profit statuses of hospitals – 
whether or not a hospital is for-profit or non-profit – and the quality of hospital care for 
small hospitals (bed counts ranging from approximately 50-200 beds). In addition to 
exploring this relationship, I also examine the effect of hospital and market 
characteristics such as Case Mix Index and state uninsured rate on patient revenues and 
profitability.  
 In designing the Balanced Scorecard and its use in accounting, Kaplan and Norton 
(1996) suggest that the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard “gives managers a way 
of ensuring that all levels of the organization understand the long-term strategy and that 
both departmental and individual objectives are aligned with it,” instead of having 
individual incentives being tied solely to short term financial performance. 1 Kaplan and 
Norton suggest that managers can use the Balanced Scorecard in an attempt to balance 
financial performance with other long-term performance goals such as customer 
satisfaction, keeping efficient internal business processes, and continuing Learning and 
Growth. I believe that the managers of for-profit hospitals have to show greater 
performance in financial measures than their non-profit managerial counterparts, and will 
accordingly shift the balance of perspectives more towards the financial perspective and 
away from quality and customer perspectives than non-profit hospitals. My study 
																																								 																				
1 Kaplan, Robert S. and David P. Norton, “Using the Balanced Scorecard as a Strategic Management 
System.” (1996). 
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provides evidence of the redistribution of weight between quality and financial 
performance between for-profit and non-profit hospitals.  
 To answer this research question, I collected data on approximately 250 hospitals 
in the United States ranging in bed size from 50-200 beds. I used comprehensive quality 
data produced by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services – Total Performance 
Score – which can be broken down into four segments of quality measurement. I also 
collected data regarding the revenues and net incomes of these hospitals and their status 
as private non-profit or private for-profit. State-level market characteristics were used as 
control variables to take out some regional differences due to varying uninsured rates and 
effects due to the election of Medicare Expansion.  
 I found evidence of the shift such that there was more emphasis on 
financial performance in for-profit hospitals versus non-profit hospitals, which coincided 
with a shift away from performance in quality measures in these same hospitals. I also 
found that state characteristics have significant effects on financial performance, but 
these are out of managers’ control but may lead to objectives to mitigate unfavorable 
effects due to state-level market characteristics. The findings from this study may not 
apply to large, metropolitan hospitals as these hospitals face different challenges and 
pressures than these smaller, more regional hospitals.			
 In the next two sections of the paper, I discuss previous literature on shifts 
towards or away from quality performance based on for-profit status, as well as some 
drivers of financial performance for hospitals as well as my hypotheses. Following, in 
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Chapter 4, I lay out my methodology in detail, followed by results in Chapter 5, 
discussion of results in Chapter 6, and conclusions in Chapter 7.  
 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
The rising number of not-profit hospitals facing bankruptcy or financial distress 
suggests the potential for these hospitals to be taken over by for-profit organizations. The 
differing financial objectives of each ownership type will affect how the hospital runs, 
and thus likely affect the quality of the hospital. For each ownership status, there are 
three possibilities: decrease in quality from not-profit to for-profit, continuance of the 
same quality level, or increase in quality. The empirical studies that most closely examine 
this follow for each conclusion. 
 
2.1 Decrease in Quality 
 Picone et al. (2002)2 look into whether the conversion to for-profit status of a 
hospital is harmful to patients and to Medicare. The study examined the effects due to 
conversions from not-profit to for-profit and vice versa. The researchers hypothesize that 
conversion to for-profit should reduce quality because of the increase in profit seeking 
																																								 																				
2 Picone, Gabriel, Shin-Yi Chou, and Frank Sloan. "Are For-Profit Hospital Conversions Harmful to 
Patients and to Medicare?" The RAND Journal of Economics 33, no. 3 (2002): 507-23. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3087470. 
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strategies, and the reverse should occur with the conversion to not-profit. The study 
controlled for local payment rates, population density, and year. The control for local 
payment rates were based on the wage index that is used by Medicare to set their 
payment rates at hospitals. This wage index is location specific and gives an idea of the 
market of the hospital. These explanatory variables help control for technological and 
political changes, as well as local price discrepancies. The study found that conversion to 
for-profit status led to an increase in mortality rates, the study’s measure of quality, but 
did not find evidence of the reverse effect.  This finding led to the conclusion that the 
change in quality was not the result of conversion of ownership status, but due to the 
ownership status itself. 
 
2.2 No Net Change 
Farsi (2004)3 examined the effect of conversion between not-profit to for-profit 
statuses on healthcare quality for hospitals in California. The study focused on the time 
period of 1990-1998. The study examined the health outcomes of elderly patients treated 
for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) and Congestive Heart Failure (CHF). To measure 
quality, the study used risk adjusted mortality rates for these conditions as an indicator. 
The study controlled for time variations of quality trends before the conversion through 
the use of a linear trend. It also controlled for Medicare status, by choosing patients over 
the age of 65, and for hospital selection bias by sampling acute conditions treated through 
																																								 																				
3 Farsi, Mehdi. "Changes in Hospital Quality after Conversion in Ownership Status." International Journal 
of Health Care Finance and Economics 4, no. 3 (2004): 211-30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3528898. 
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emergency rooms. The purpose behind these controls is to isolate the effect of conversion 
on quality, and to eliminate both patient selection and admission bias in hospitals, as 
acute conditions are most likely to be treated at the nearest hospital, due to the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which requires hospitals to 
treat all patients in the emergency rooms regardless of their ability to pay. The study 
found that the conversion to for-profit led to an increase in AMI mortality rates, while the 
conversion to not-profit led to an increase in the CHF mortality rates. The study 
concluded, “health outcomes in different diagnoses may represent different dimensions of 
hospital quality” (212). This suggests more research needs to be done to fully support this 
hypothesis. 
A popular theory regarding the label of not-profit is that it can be used to indicate 
quality. That is, companies will take not-for-profit status in order to signal the quality of 
their institution. Malani and David (2008)4 empirically tested this theory by looking at 
whether firms in the hospital, nursing home, and child care industries advertise their not-
for-profit status on their website or yellow pages listing. The rationale behind taking not-
profit status, at least for a hospital, should be to provide more community benefits, as 
outlined in the Affordable Care Act and the Community Health Needs Assessment. 
Malani and David (2008) outline the four major theories in existing literature. These 
theories include principals who “have quasi-altruistic motives, such as providing high-
quality service, take non-profit status to financially support these motives,” providing 
community benefit for an underprovided government good, taking advantage of the tax 
																																								 																				
4	Malani, Anup, and Guy David. "Does Nonprofit Status Signal Quality?" The Journal of Legal Studies 37, 
no. 2 (2008): 551-76. doi:10.1086/589668.	
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breaks as a for-profit in disguise, and the use of not-profit status as an indicator of 
quality. For the last theory, the rationale lies in the fact that not-profit status removes 
profit incentive, thus cost cutting through the reduction of quality will not increase the 
money taken home, so any incentive to cut quality is gone.  
The study found that more often than not, not-profit firms fail to indicate their 
not-profit status, whether that is through their website or yellow pages listing. Thus the 
study found little support for the theory that not-for-profit status is used to indicate 
quality. The study does acknowledge that they did not examine other forms of 
advertisements such as television ads, radio ads, or other forms of print ads. These may 
be used more often to indicate the not-for-profit status to consumers. The authors posit 
that more research must be done on this theory to fully support their conclusion. 
 
2.2.1 The Spillover Effect 
 An effect mentioned, but not studied, in many hospital studies is the spillover 
effect. This effect in a healthcare setting describes a situation where the presence of for-
profit hospitals results in an increase in efficiency for not-profit hospitals. Kessler and 
McClellan (2002)5 examined the effect of hospital ownership on healthcare productivity 
and financial performance. The study controlled for selection bias and the spillover effect 
of for-profit hospitals on other hospitals in the area. The idea behind this is that by 
controlling for these effects, the study can isolate the effect of ownership status on 
																																								 																				
5	Kessler, Daniel P., and Mark B. McClellan. "The Effects of Hospital Ownership on Medical 
Productivity." The RAND Journal of Economics 33, no. 3 (2002): 488-506. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3087469. 
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hospital productivity and remove differences in patient populations. The study found that 
areas with for-profit hospital have lower expenditures without changes in health 
outcomes. This highlights the spillover effect for-profit hospitals have on other hospitals 
in their regions. The study acknowledges that the spillover effect is not separated from 
direct effect of hospital ownership, but still provides us insight that the presence of for-
profit hospitals does not decrease the quality of surrounding hospitals, but may help 
increase the efficiency of operations. This is important because it demonstrates that the 
quality of an institution doesn’t necessarily have to fall when increasing efficiency, and 
for a not-profit hospital, the patient is the only one who stands to benefit from this effect 
through lower prices, increased future quality, or a possible expansion of services.  
 A limitation discussed by Kessler and McClellan (2008) was the small percentage 
of hospitals that were of for-profit status. The recent trend of financial troubles for not-
for-profit hospitals and takeovers of these struggling hospitals by for-profit enterprises 
could increase the importance of these findings. Both the direct and spillover effects 
could increase and truly influence how hospitals operate, regardless of ownership. 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 The Effect of the Uninsured  
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Batty and Ippolito (2017)6 examined the effects of the recent fair pricing laws on 
the quality of care given. Fair pricing laws put a cap on how much a hospital can charge 
an uninsured patient. Before these laws, insurance companies negotiated a price that they 
would pay to hospitals for a treatment, which was often below the list price, but 
uninsured patients were charged the full list price. The cap put in place by these laws 
prevents hospitals from charging the uninsured more than they would from an insurance 
company for a certain service. The study examined whether these fair pricing laws 
affected both the quantity and quality of care given to uninsured patients. The study 
found that quantity of care was reduced with the implementation of the fair pricing laws, 
with both for-profit and non-profit hospitals acting similarly. Quality of care was 
measured using mortality rates, and rates of preventable complications. The researchers 
found that both short term and long term quality of care for the uninsured were not 
significantly affected by fair pricing laws. 
 
2.3 Increase in Quality 
 Pai et al. (2017)7 studied the effects of hospital quality and efficiency on hospital 
closures. Using various measures of efficiency and quality, as well as interaction 
variables between these two areas, the study found that multiple quality measures and 
for-profit status were positively correlated with hospital survival. This indicates a 
																																								 																				
6	Batty, Michael, and Benedic Ippolito. “Financial Incentives, Hospital Care, and Health Outcomes: 
Evidence from Fair Pricing Laws.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9, no. 2 (2017): 28-56. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20160060 
7Pai, Dinesh R., Hengameh Hosseini and Richard S. Brown. “Does efficiency and quality of care affect 
hospital closure” Health Systems (2017). DOI: 10.1080/20476965.2017.1405874 
9	
	
potential positive relationship between quality and for-profit status. In light of the 
financial struggles of not-profit hospitals today, this potential relationship must be studied 
further. Other research indicates either a decrease in quality or no change in quality 
comes with profit status, which means there might be an issue of correlation between 
these two independent variables in the regression created by Pai et al.  
 
2.4 Other Quality Measures 
2.4.1 Patient Experience and Perception 
 Jha et al. (2008)8 examined hospital performance over a range of patient 
experience measures, and examined whether theoretically key hospital characteristics for 
patient experience are actually correlated with better patient experiences. These key 
hospital characteristics were measures such as nonacademic status and for-profit status. 
To measure patient experience, the study used data from the Hospital Consumer 
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey which is filled out 
by patients after hospital visits. The researchers found that fewer patients gave high 
ratings if they were treated in a for-profit hospital versus those treated in a non-profit 
hospital. Taking a closer look, for-profit hospitals received worse performance grades 
than non-profit hospitals in all areas of the HCAHPS survey. Overall, the majority of 
patients were satisfied with care, but there still was a significant difference between for-
profit and non-profit hospitals. 
																																								 																				
8 Jha, Ashish K., MD, MPH, et al. “Patients’ Perception of Hospital Care in the United States” New 
England Journal of Medicine (2008): 359:1921-1931. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMsa0804116		
10	
	
The study also found that a higher ratio of nurses to patient-days corresponded 
with higher patient ratings on the HCAHPS survey. Comparing the highest quartile of 
this ratio to the lowest quartile, the largest performance differences in patient experience 
were in nursing services, discharge instructions, communication with nurses, and 
communication about medications. The highest quartile hospitals in regards to the nurses 
to patient-days ratio performed better in these areas, which is in-line with the 
performance of non-profit hospitals in comparison to for-profit hospitals. This suggests 
that non-profit hospitals relatively employ more nurses than for-profit hospitals. 
 
2.5 Profitability of Hospitals 
Through the declaration of non-profit or for-profit status, hospital management is 
generally announcing their financial goals. For-profit hospitals seek to maximize profits 
with methods that can vary by institution. Non-profit hospitals serve to provide 
community benefit, but some believe that non-profit hospitals act as for-profits in 
disguise.  
 
 
 
 
2.5.1 Increased Profitability of For-Profit Hospitals 
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 Picone et al. (2002)9 examined hospital level finances and staffing in addition to 
quality of care. The study found that the conversion from non-profit to for-profit 
ownership resulted in a significant increase in operating margins following the 
conversion, and that leading up to the conversion, operating margins followed a declining 
trend. This observed trend is in line with the idea that for-profit institutions seek to 
maximize profits. Additionally, this trend suggests that declining financial position may 
lead to the conversion from non-profit to for-profit status. The study also found that 
following conversion to for-profit status, hospital employment declined, coinciding with 
the observed decline in quality mentioned in section 2.1, while hospitals converting to 
non-profit status experienced an increase in employment. Employment of hospital staff is 
often a large expense for hospitals, and declining employment fits with profit 
maximization principles.  
 Similar to these findings, Jha et al. (2008)10 found that hospitals with relatively 
higher employment of nurses corresponded to better patient experience than lower 
employment rates. In conjunction with their findings that non-profit hospitals give 
patients a better experience than for-profit hospitals, a logical conclusion is that non-
profit hospitals are more likely than for-profit hospitals to be in the highest quartile of the 
nurses to patient-days ratio. This positive correlation between high nurse to patient-days 
ratio and non-profit status leads me to the conclusion that the profit maximization of for-
																																								 																				
9 Picone, Gabriel, Shin-Yi Chou, and Frank Sloan. "Are For-Profit Hospital Conversions Harmful to 
Patients and to Medicare?" The RAND Journal of Economics 33, no. 3 (2002): 507-23. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3087470. 
10 Jha, Ashish K., MD, MPH, et al. “Patients’ Perception of Hospital Care in the United States” New 
England Journal of Medicine (2008): 359:1921-1931. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMsa0804116	
12	
	
profit hospitals would lead to lower rates of nurse employment and thus lower patient 
experience ratings. 
 
2.5.2 Effect of the Uninsured on Profitability 
 Garthwaite et al. (2018)11 researched the effects of uninsured people on hospital 
profit. EMTALA requires hospitals to treat anybody in need of emergency medical 
treatment, regardless of their ability to pay the hospital bill. Additionally, “nonprofit 
hospitals must provide a community benefit in order to maintain their tax exemptions”.12 
As outlined by Nicholson et al. (2000)13, the most obvious community benefit a hospital 
can provide is uncompensated care, which is most often provided to the low-income, 
uninsured population. Due to EMTALA and requirements to maintain tax exemptions, 
Garthwaite et al. (2018) argue that non-profit hospitals serve as insurers of last resort, 
bearing the majority of the cost of providing uncompensated care. The study calculated 
that each additional uninsured person in a state is associated with approximately $800 in 
uncompensated care costs. The study further calculated that since eight percent of 
uninsured people report an in-patient hospital visit, the $800 cost per uninsured person 
corresponds with approximately $11,000 in uncompensated care costs per uninsured 
inpatient visit. These costs would significantly drive down profit margins of hospitals 
																																								 																				
11	Garthwaite, Craig, Tal Gross, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo. “Hospitals as Insurers of Last Resort” 
American Economic Journal: Applied EconomicsI 10, no. 1 (2018): 1-39. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150581		
12Garthwaite, Craig, Tal Gross, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo. “Hospitals as Insurers of Last Resort” 
American Economic Journal: Applied EconomicsI 10, no. 1 (2018): 1-39. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150581. Page 2 
13Nicholson, Sean, Mark. V. Pauly, Lawton R. Burns, Agnieshka Baumritter, and David A. Asch. 
“Measuring Community Benefits Provided by For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals” Heath Affairs 19, no. 6 
(2000). https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.19.6.168 	
13	
	
providing the uncompensated care. The study examined how hospital ownership affected 
the share of the uninsured population and the effect on uncompensated care costs. They 
concluded that non-profit hospitals bear more uncompensated care costs than for-profit 
hospitals, and is even more apparent in for-profit hospitals operating near non-profit 
hospitals. The authors postulate that this difference may be partly explained by tailoring 
down the quantity of care provided to uninsured patients to comply with EMTALA but 
also come closer to meeting financial targets.  
 The study also found that non-profit hospitals are not able to pass on all of these 
costs to insured patients, and estimates that hospitals may absorb around 2/3 of the 
uncompensated care costs. But the costs that are not absorbed may not be passed on to 
insured patients as they could be offset by government transfers, such as transfers relating 
to uncompensated care like disproportionate share payments, or other government 
transfers, like those associated with the Total Performance Score metric, which will be 
explained later in the paper. Overall, non-profit hospitals bear the majority of 
uncompensated care costs, driving down profit margins, and potentially leading to 
financial distress and eventually hospital closure. 
 
 
 
 
2.5.3 Medicare vs. Private Insurance 
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Selden et al. (2015)14 examined the difference between public and private 
insurance payment rates for inpatient hospital care. The study examined payment rates 
over the time period from 1996 to 2012, controlling for inflation and standardized across 
patient and hospital stay characteristics. In 1996, private insurance had a payment rate 
6.1% greater than Medicare payment rates. Over time, this gap widened to 75.3%. These 
findings were consistent with payment rate estimates from the American Hospital 
Association Annual Survey of Hospitals. The implication for hospitals is with a state’s 
election of Medicare expansion, more people are covered by Medicare, which reduces the 
number of people potentially covered by private insurance, and potentially reduces the 
number of privately insured people. The increased Medicare coverage in combination 
with widening payment rates is unfavorable for hospital profitability. 
 
2.6 Relating Background Research to the Question 
The current sector trends starts to support my hypothesis regarding the managerial 
focus of non-profit hospitals, at least on a sector-wide level, but my study will check if 
this is true with more hospital specific data, as well as investigating the other half of the 
overarching hypothesis regarding the managerial focus of for-profit hospitals. 
While this study does not focus on the effects of profit status conversion on 
quality due to the lack of data available to me, the effects of hospital profit status on 
quality of care can be helpful in giving an idea of what might happen in a conversion. In 
																																								 																				
14	Selden, Thomas M., Zeynam Karaca, Patricia Keenan, Chapin White, and Richard Kronick. “The 
Growing Difference Between Public and Private Payment Rates For Inpatient Hospital Care” Health 
Affairs 34, no. 12 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.0706  
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acquiring a non-profit hospital, the for-profit entity will likely implement most of its 
operating strategy and values, which will in turn affect various measures of quality. 
Various aspects of quality will be examined to see where the greatest changes might 
occur.  
Additionally, the exploration into the impact of various market characteristics on 
hospital patient revenue and profitability will reveal the current effects of these 
characteristics and may provide insight into how changing healthcare legislation will 
affect these characteristics and thus patient revenue and profitability. New healthcare 
legislation may impact certain decisions hospital management can make, but the focus 
behind this decisions will remain constant. 
Through the evaluation of various outcomes, I draw conclusions regarding 
hospital management’s decision making process and the tradeoffs within the framework 
of the Balanced Scorecard. 
	
Chapter 3. Hypothesis 
 
 As outlined in the Introduction, the Balanced Scorecard was designed to help 
managers keep individual and departmental objectives aligned with both short and long-
term goals of the company. This encourages a balance between the performance in the 
financial perspective and non-financial perspectives such as quality and customer 
satisfaction. For-profit managers have to show better financial performance than non-
16	
	
profit managers, leading to a shift in the balance of perspectives, outlined in the following 
hypothesis. 
  
 Hypothesis 1(a): For-profit hospital management places more weight on financial 
performance and shift away from high performance in quality and customer satisfaction 
in comparison to non-profit hospitals.  
 
The majority of research regarding hospital quality has focused on using mortality 
rates as the main indicator of quality. While mortality rates are important to consider 
when measuring hospital quality, the rates do not capture other important aspects of 
institutional quality. As noted in the Literature Review, the studies using morality rates to 
measure quality found mixed results in regards to the effect from profit status. This alone 
does not allow me to make an educated hypothesis regarding the effects of profit status 
on Total Performance Score (TPS). TPS is a multifaceted measure of quality that 
incorporates other aspects of quality such as patient experience, cost reduction for the 
patient, and hospital safety. In conjunction with studies concerned with other aspects of 
quality such as patient experience and the basic economic concept of profit 
maximization, I am able to make hypotheses regarding the effect of hospital profit status 
on TPS and consequently each of its components. 
 
 Hypothesis 2(a): For-profit hospitals will have lower TPS quality scores. 
17	
	
 Hypothesis 2(b): Hospital profit status will not have an effect on the Clinical Care 
and Hospital Safety components of TPS. 
 Hypothesis 2(c): Hospital profit status, and more specifically, for-profit status, 
will have a negative impact on the Patient Experience and Cost Reduction & Efficiency 
components of TPS. 
 
 Such a focus on high performance can lead to worse performance in the 
financial perspective. With a focus centered on the customer, hospital management’s 
decisions would be rooted in improving patient experience in all aspects, like in 
communication with staff and low costs. This emphasis may lead to decisions that 
increase expenses while slowing or lowering revenues. Assuming this is the case, this 
management focus would lead to financial distress and potential closure if on the extreme 
side of this scenario. More likely, to remain financially viable, non-profits would perform 
worse financially than for-profit hospitals, but still at a level where they are not in risk of 
bankruptcy. Current trends in the non-profit healthcare sector provide some initial 
support to this hypothesis.  
For the year 2017, Fitch Ratings has issued a negative sector outlook for non-
profit hospitals and health systems.15 The reasoning behind this negative outlook is the 
“longer term view that the sector will be increasingly challenged by regulatory and 
political uncertainty, the growth in Medicare and Medicaid payors and meager rate 
																																								 																				
15 All information in this paragraph is derived from the following PowerPoint: Holloran, Kevin. “Sector 
Briefing: Nonprofit Hospitals and Health Systems” Fitch Ratings, July 2017.  
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increases”.16 Under the Trump Administration, there is uncertainty regarding the future of 
the Affordable Care Act put in place by the Obama Administration. Additionally low 
commercial insurance reimbursement rate increases in combination with pressure from 
rising wages and salaries will reduce margins and cost flexibility. Fitch Ratings believes 
that due to these pressures, mergers and acquisitions activity will continue at a high rate. 
In their 2018 sector outlook, both Fitch Ratings and Moody’s issued negative 
ratings for the non-profit healthcare sector.17 Moody’s credits this negative outlook to 
rising expenses and low revenue growth in recent years, and the rise of bad debt in 2017 
due to rising copays and high deductible plans. Fitch Ratings kept their negative outlook 
for many of the same reasons as in their 2017 Sector Briefing.  
 The current financial situation in the non-profit hospital sector is dire. Since 
January 2010, 83 rural hospitals have closed down, with many states seeing multiple 
closures of their local hospitals.18 According to Bloomberg data, there are currently 26 
non-profit hospitals in default or distress, many of which are based in rural areas. 
Additionally, Bloomberg reports an estimated 44% of rural hospitals currently operate at 
																																								 																				
16 Holloran, Kevin. “Sector Briefing: Nonprofit Hospitals and Health Systems” Fitch Ratings, July 2017. 
Slide 2.		
17 All information in the paragraph is from: Ellison, Ayla. “Fitch issues negative outlook for nonprofit 
hospitals: 4 things to know” Becker’s Hospital Review. December 06, 2017, 
https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/fitch-issues-negative-outlook-for-nonprofit-hospitals-4-
things-to-know.html 
Ellison, Ayla. “Moody’s: Outlook is negative for nonprofit hospital sector” Becker’s Hospital Review. 
December 04,2017, https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/moody-s-outlook-is-negative-for-
nonprofit-hospital-sector.html  
18 Ellison, Ayla. “State-by-state breakdown of 83 rural hospital closures” Becker’s Hospital Review. 
January 26, 2018, https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/state-by-state-breakdown-of-83-rural-
hospital-closures.html  
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a loss.19 Continuing with the trend of financial distress in non-profit healthcare, 
healthcare bankruptcies more than tripled in 2017 while bankruptcy filings overall have 
been declining since 2010, per Bloomberg.20 As a part of this report, the reduction in 
Disproportionate Share Hospital payments – payments made by the US government to 
hospitals that treat a large number of uninsured and Medicaid covered people – is cited as 
a main reason for the financial distress of rural hospitals.  
 Much of this is attributable to factors mentioned by Moody’s and Fitch Ratings in 
their negative sector outlooks for the non-profit healthcare industry. With the current 
financial distress of non-profit hospitals, these hospitals may close down, or be acquired 
by larger health systems. There has been a rise in for-profit companies acquiring non-
profit hospitals.21 In combination with Fitch Ratings’ prediction of increased Mergers and 
Acquisitions activity, it is definitely possible to see more non-profit hospitals convert to 
for-profit entities.  
As discussed in the introduction, Total Performance Score has financial incentives 
aligned with higher scores. This financial incentive should help hospital profitability as 
theorized by Garthwaite et al. (2018) as it would help offset the uncompensated care 
costs associated with treating uninsured patients. Following Garthwaite et al. (2018) 
further, the uninsured rate should negatively impact profitability since according to the 
																																								 																				
19 Moran, Danielle, and Rebecca Spalding. “Hospital Distress to Grow If Congress Closes Door to Muni 
Market” Bloomberg. December 8, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-08/hospital-
distress-to-grow-if-congress-closes-door-to-muni-market  
20 Ellison, Ayla. “Healthcare bankruptcies more than triple in 2017” Becker’s Hospital Review. November 
28, 2017, https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/healthcare-bankruptcies-more-than-triple-in-
2017.html  
21 Gamble, Molly. “8 Issues Surrounding a For-Profit Company’s Acquisition of Non-Profit Hospitals” 
Becker’s Hospital Review. January, 14, 2011, https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-
transactions-and-valuation/8-issues-surrounding-a-for-profit-companys-acquisitions-of-non-profit-
hospitals.html		
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study, each additional uninsured person in the state costs a hospital $800 in 
uncompensated care. Accordingly, I hypothesize that my data and analysis will have 
similar findings.  
 
 Hypothesis 3(a): Hospitals in the top 50% of TPS will show an increased 
profitability. 
 Hypothesis 3(b): Hospitals in states with higher uninsured rates will have lower 
profitability than hospitals in states with lower uninsured rates. 
 
 Another factor affecting profitability is a state’s election of Medicare expansion. 
This expansion of Medicare coverage creates an issue for hospital profitability since 
payment rate differences between private and public insurance have widened 
dramatically over the past couple decades, which is outlined in the Literature Review, 
section 2.5.2. Following this logic I hypothesize a negative relationship between 
Medicare expansion and hospital profitability. 
 
 Hypothesis 3(c): Hospitals located in states who elected for Medicare expansion 
will be less profitable than hospitals in non-expansion states.  
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 Based on the economic theory of profit maximization, which theoretically only 
applies to for-profit hospitals, profit status should positively affect profitability. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1c and the research done by Jha et al. (2008) and Picone et al. 
(2002). For-profit hospitals often work to cut costs by lowering employment, which 
increases profitability but also worsens patient experience, and I structure my hypothesis 
accordingly. 
 
 Hypothesis 3(d): For-profit hospitals will have higher profitability than non-profit 
hospitals. 
 
 Shifting to patient revenue, the profit status of a hospital should positively impact 
patient revenue since profit maximization involves both reducing costs and maximizing 
revenues. For-profit hospitals likely have negotiated profit maximization prices with 
insurance companies more so than non-profit hospitals as outlined by Garthwaite et al. 
(2018). Garthwaite et al. (2018) also stated approximately 8% of uninsured people 
reported an inpatient hospital visit per year, so hospitals located in states with higher 
uninsured rates should see higher patient revenues. For hospitals located in Medicare 
expansion states, a larger percentage of the population is medically insured, and insured 
people are more likely to visit the hospital if needed than uninsured people, which I 
expect to translate to higher patient revenue. The payments received for being in the top 
50% of TPS hospitals wouldn’t count as patient revenue, and thus should not have an 
effect on patient revenue.  
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 Hypothesis 4(a): For-profit status and election of Medicare expansion will 
positively impact the patient revenue of a hospital. 
 Hypothesis 4(b): Higher state uninsured rates will have a negative impact on 
patient revenue. 
 Hypothesis 4(c): Hospitals in the top 50% of TPS will not experience a change in 
patient revenue on account of their standing in the top 50% of TPS. 
 
Chapter 4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Data Sources 
 Data was collected from various sources. More specifically, TPS data was 
collected from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)22, and hospital 
characteristics and financial data from the American Hospital Directory. American 
Hospital Directory draws its data from CMS, the U.S Department of Health and Human 
Services, Cost Report Data – who obtains information from CMS – and Skilled Nursing 
Facilities data. State uninsured rates and Medicare expansion data were obtained from the 
U.S. Census Bureau.  
																																								 																				
22 “Total Performance Score Information” Medicare.gov, 
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/data/total-performance-scores.html  
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 This study focuses on acute care hospitals, excluding specialty hospitals and 
critical access hospitals. The sample covers 247 hospitals from all states in the United 
States. The sample strives to achieve an even mix of private for-profit and private non-
profit hospitals, but is weighted towards non-profit hospitals, as that is a more accurate 
reflection of the composition of hospitals in the country.  
 
4.2 Econometric Models 
 Through the use of multiple econometric models, I sought to find a relationship 
between profit status and quality, and within the composite quality measure, which 
aspects of hospital quality are the drivers of this relationship. The regressions were run 
using the ordinary least squares method.  
 Regressions (1)-(6) model the relationship between hospital profit status and 
various quality measures. Regressions (7)-(8) examine the hospital characteristics and 
market drivers of hospital profitability and patient revenues. All variables are further 
explained in the following section. 
 
(1)            𝑇𝑃𝑆 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
(2)           𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
(3)           𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
(4)           𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
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(5)           𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
(6)           𝑇𝑃𝑆50 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀  
(7)    𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +𝛽!𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑋𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝐶𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑃𝑆50+ 𝜀  
(8) 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑣 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +𝛽!𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑋𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝐶𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑃𝑆50+ 𝜀     
    
If for any reason, a hospital is missing an observation for one of the variables, the 
hospital was dropped from that specific regression. Missing observations occurred for 
very few hospitals in various components of TPS because a certain domain could not be 
calculated for a given hospital. In this case, the three domains that were scored were 
reweighted to 33.33% each from the original 25% weight.23 
 
 
 
4.3 Dependent Variables 
4.3.1 Measuring Quality 
 The majority of studies researching hospital quality used mortality rates as the 
indicator for quality. This is an important measure, but does not incorporate many other 
																																								 																				
23 Medicare.gov, “Total Performance Score Information”  
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aspects of quality. Others examine patient experience or infection rates. Each of these 
measures are good indicators of quality, but it is necessary to look at a composite quality 
measure as well as each of the components.  
Total Performance Score (TPS) 
 This study assesses hospital quality using Total Performance Score (TPS), which 
is a composite quality measure developed by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS). It consists of 4 equally weighted domains: a Clinical Care domain, 
Patient and Caregiver-Centered Experience of Care/Care Coordination domain, Safety 
domain, and an Efficiency and Cost Reduction domain. 
 I will examine the effects of various hospital characteristics on TPS to look at 
how these characteristics may affect hospital quality. 
Total Performance Score Components 
 As explained by CMS24, each domain has various factors that comprise the 
domain score. The Clinical Care (ClinicalCare) score is made up of three mortality 
measures. The Patient Experience (PatientExperience) score takes into account eight 
measures from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
(HCAHPS) survey, which is a required patient satisfaction survey developed by CMS. 
The Safety (SafetyScore) score consists of one Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality measure, five healthcare related infection measures, and one pregnancy and 
delivery care measure. The Efficiency and Cost Reduction (CostRedScore) is based on 
																																								 																				
24	Medicare.gov,	“Total	Performance	Score	Information”		
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the Medicare Spending per Beneficiary (MSPB) measure. The MSPB is controlled for 
local wage index to mitigate any regional differences in pricing. 25 
 The mortality indices composing the Clinical Care score are measured in survival 
rates, so the mortality indices are directly proportional to the Clinical Care score, such 
that higher survival rates mean a higher Clinical Care score. The Patient Experience score 
is also directly proportional to its components, with higher scores representing higher 
patient satisfaction. The Safety score is inversely proportional to its comprising factors. 
The factors are measures in infection rates and elective early delivery, and lower rates in 
each factor corresponds to a higher Safety score. The Efficiency and Cost Reduction 
score is inversely proportional to the Medicare Spending per Beneficiary measure. A 
lower MSPB means the patient had lower charges and more efficient care.26 Low MSPB 
scores translate to higher Efficiency and Cost Reduction scores for the hospital.27  
 Each of these TPS components capture unique and important aspects of hospital 
quality, and I will analyze hospital characteristics effects on each of these components to 
discover the drivers of hospital characteristic effects on the TPS quality measure.  
TPS dummy based on 50th percentile cutoff (TPS50) 
TPS was developed as part of the Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) program in 
healthcare and has financial incentives tied to it. Hospitals in the top 50% of TPS receive 
																																								 																				
25	CMS.gov,	“2014	Measure	Information	About	the	Medicare	Spending	per	Beneficiary,	Calculated	for	the	
Value-Based	Payment	Modifier	Program”	
26	“2014	Measure	Information	About	the	Medicare	Spending	per	Beneficiary,	Calculated	for	the	Value-
Based	Payment	Modifier	Program”	Centers	For	Medicare	&	Medicaid	Services.	Last	modified	April	2015,	
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/PhysicianFeedbackProgram/Downloads/2014-MIF-MSPB-TIN-2015-May.pdf	
27	Wheeler-Bunch,	Bethany,	MSHA	“Hospital	Value-Based	Purchasing	(VBP)	Program	Fiscal	Year	(FY)	2018	
Percentage	Payment	Summary	Report	(PPSR)	Overview	Presentation”	July	24,	2017.		
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payments which are funded by penalties imposed on hospitals in the bottom 50% of TPS. 
The use of this median cut dummy variable will allow me to investigate the effect of 
profit status on the likelihood of paying a fine or receiving a bonus.  
 
4.3.2 Measuring Financial Performance 
Common Sized Profit (CSprofit) 
 I use common-sized profit as a dependent variable to examine the factors that 
most greatly influence profit maximization in hospitals. The profit is common-sized to 
control for size of the hospital and potential cost differences that could arise in looking at 
the dollar amount of profit. It is expressed in percentage form rather than decimal form 
for ease of interpretation. 
Patient Revenue (patientrev) 
 Using all the same explanatory variables as used in the regression with common 
sizes profit as the dependent variables, the use of patient revenue as the dependent 
variable allows me to examine how the identified hospital characteristics affect patient 
revenue and the hospital costs. Without explicit information regarding hospital cost 
structure, this comparison of two regressions gives me an idea of the drivers of certain 
hospital costs. Patient Revenue is measured in millions of dollars. 
 
4.4 Independent Variables 
28	
	
Profit Status (profitstatus) 
 In my sample, I limited my hospital scope to examine for-profit hospitals and 
private, non-religiously affiliated not-for-profit hospitals. Thus not-for-profit hospitals 
associated with a church and government owned hospitals were excluded from the 
sample.  
 I used a dummy variable to indicate the profit status for the hospital, with a value 
of one representing a for-profit hospital, and a value of zero representing the not-for-
profit hospitals in my sample.  
Profit Status and Common Sized Profit Interaction (statusCSprofit) 
 This interaction variable examined the effect on quality that profitability has 
given that the hospital is a for-profit hospital. 
State Uninsured Rate (uninsured) 
 This variable records the medically uninsured rate for the state in which a given 
hospital is located. 
Medicare Expansion State (MedicareExpansion) 
 A dummy variable is used to indicate if a given hospital is located in a Medicare 
expansion state. The variable takes a value of one if the hospital is in a Medicare 
expansion state, and zero if not. 
Uninsured Rate and Medicare Expansion Interaction (uninsuredXexpansion) 
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 This interaction captures the effect of the state’s uninsured rate given that it is a 
Medicare expansion state on profitability and patient revenue. 
Case Mix Index (CMI) 
 Case Mix Index “is analogous to product mix in a manufacturing context.”28 Each 
procedure performed at a hospital is grouped into a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) and 
each DRG is assigned a relative weight. The relative weights are added up and divided by 
the total number of DRG’s for the year to get CMI. CMI was designed to calculate 
hospital payments, and so gives relative information regarding hospital reimbursement.29 
It is used principally as a control variable to control for hospitals performing different 
procedures. 
Top 50% of TPS (TPS50) 
 The variable remains the same as mentioned above in the dependent variable 
section. It is included as an independent variable in regressions (7) and (8) since the top 
50% of TPS hospitals receive a monetary bonus and the bottom 50% pay a fine, which 
may impact profitability and patient revenue. 
 
Chapter 5. Results 
 
																																								 																				
28	Younis,	Mustafa,	et	al.	“Hospital	profitability	in	Florida:	a	revisitation”	Research	in	Healthcare	Financial	
Management	8,	no.	1	(2003).	ISSN:	1524-1521.	http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Research-in-
Healthcare-Financial-Management/100108379.html		
29	Mendez,	Carmen	M.	MD,	et	al.	“Impact	of	Hospital	Variable	on	Case	Mix	Index	as	a	Marker	of	Disease	
Severity”	Population	Health	Management	17,	no.1	(2014):	28-34.	DOI:	10.1089/pop.20130002		
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5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for all hospitals in the data set, while 
Tables 2 and 3 break up the descriptive statistics by non-profit hospitals and for-profit 
hospitals respectively. The descriptive statistics in Tables 2 and 3 provide some 
interesting information regarding hospital financial strategy and quality emphasis. The 
significance of the differences will be discussed with the results of the regressions, but a 
few notable findings will be touched up here.  
The first difference to note is in the CSprofit variable. As mentioned in the 
Methodology section, this variable measures Net Income as a percentage of Total 
Revenue. The most profitable hospitals are extremely similar for non-profits and for-
profits, earning a Net Income that is 12.07% and 12.21% of Total Revenue respectively. 
But the least profitable non-profit and for-profit hospitals show a stark contrast that 
highlights the emphasis of for-profit hospitals on profit maximization and the lowered 
emphasis for non-profit hospitals. The least profitable non-profit hospital had a loss that 
was 21.77% of Total Revenue, while the least profitable for-profit hospital’s loss was 
only 4.71% of Total Revenue. The large loss posted by the least profitable non-profit 
hospital could indicate a “big bath” year, where many assets are written down to lower 
future expenses, while increasing the loss in the current year.  More likely it represents 
financial trouble for that hospital. This is backed up by the lower average common sized 
profit for non-profit hospitals in comparison to for-profits. This makes non-profit 
hospitals more susceptible to financial trouble in the event of a negative shock to the 
market.  
31	
	
The profit maximization emphasis also shows up through the difference in patient 
revenue. Hospitals negotiate reimbursement rates with insurance companies, but these 
rates vary between hospitals and insurance companies. For-profit hospitals are more 
likely to negotiate the profit-maximizing price with insurance companies, which would 
raise the patient income. In the data set, this shows as both the minimum and maximum 
patient revenue of for-profit hospitals is higher than the minimum and maximum for non-
profit hospitals. In combination with the difference in profitability, the stark difference in 
patient revenue demonstrates the for-profit hospital’s increased emphasis on profit 
maximization in comparison to their non-profit counterparts.  
 
5.2 Regression Results 
 After running regressions to test each hypothesis, the following results were 
produced (Tables 4 and 5). Examining profit status’ effect on quality in the broadest 
sense, hypothesis 2(a) was supported.  For-profit status led to Total Performance Scores 
that were 6.41 points lower than the scores of non-profit hospitals. This impact is 
statistically significant with a p-value of p=0.000. The difference in quality is an 
important finding to note as it represents a 6.41% difference when calculated from the 
range of possible scores, but when looking at the range of scores in the sample, the 
difference grows to an 11.68% difference. The interaction variable between profit status 
and common sized profit was not statistically different from zero, but the sign is 
interesting to note. The effect of this variable was positive meaning that the more 
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profitable for-profit hospitals had slightly higher TPS scores than non-profit hospitals. 
Next I will look at which aspects of quality drive this difference in overall quality. 
 Once broken down into its four components, the regressions provided supports for 
hypotheses 2(b) and 2(c). Neither the Clinical Care nor Safety components of TPS were 
significantly affected by the profit status of the hospital, providing support for hypothesis 
2(b). The interaction variable also did not come back statistically significant in either 
regression. These results indicate that for-profit and non-profit hospitals do not differ in 
terms of Clinical Care and Safety. In the healthcare industry, this is important to note, 
because it tells us that profit maximization does not go so far as to affect survival rates or 
infection rates. Had the regressions shown a significant effect by profit status on either of 
these TPS components, it would be concerning to see a differing emphasis on the basic 
parts of healthcare based on differing management goals.  
 While there was no effect on Safety or Clinical Care, profit status had a 
statistically significant effect on both Patient Experience and Cost Reduction and 
Efficiency scores. Looking closer at the Patient Experience regression, I found that for-
profit hospitals have Patient Experience scores 8.78 points lower than their non-profit 
counterparts. This result had a p-value of p=0.001 making it statistically significant at the 
0.1% level. For-profit status also had a negative impact on the Cost Reduction and 
Efficiency score. For-profit status led to Cost Reduction scores 10.89 points lower than 
non-profit status. The result is statistically significant at the 1% level with a p-value of 
p=0.007. This means that for-profit hospitals are worse at reducing costs for the patient, 
which follows profit maximization theory. The interaction variable in this regression is 
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statistically significant at the 10% level, where a 1% increase in common sized profit in a 
for-profit hospital corresponds to a 1.43 point increase in Cost Reduction score. This goes 
against the impact of profit status, but is an interesting finding. Potential reasons will be 
explored in the following Discussion section.  
 The final regression examining profit status’ impact on quality used a median 
cutoff dummy variable to see if for-profit status made a hospital more or less likely than a 
non-profit hospital to pay the fine associated with being in the bottom 50% of TPS 
scores. This would provide additional support for hypothesis 2(a). Running a logit 
regression, I found for-profit status makes a hospital significantly more likely to be in the 
lower 50% of Total Performance Scores.30 Again, the interaction variable between profit 
status and common sized profit was not statistically significant. 
 Shifting focus to the market drivers of profitability and patient revenue, the 
market characteristics examined often had opposite effects on profitability and patient 
revenue. For-profit status has a positive impact on common sized profit, increasing 
common sized profit by .82 percentage points from non-profit status, but this result is 
only significant at the 10% level. This provides support for hypothesis 3(d), even if the 
support isn’t the strongest.  
Common sized profit is negatively impacted by high uninsured rates in the state 
and a state’s election of Medicare expansion. A one percent increase in uninsured rate 
leads to a .36 percentage point decrease in common sized profit. This is consistent with 
																																								 																				
30	I	also	ran	this	as	an	ordinary	least	squares	regression	and	found	consistent	results,	a	negative	impact,	
but	with	a	smaller	coefficient.	Results	are	shown	in	Table	6	in	the	Appendix.	I	felt	that	a	logit	regression	
was	more	appropriate	due	to	the	binary	nature	of	the	dependent	variable.	
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the findings of Garthwaite et al. (2018) and supports hypothesis 3(b). Hypothesis 3(c) 
was also supported as hospitals located in Medicare expansion states see their common 
sized profit decrease by 4.65 percentage points. Both the uninsured and Medicare 
expansion coefficients are significant at the 1% level.  
 Interestingly, the interaction variable between the uninsured rate of the state and 
the election of Medicare expansion has a positive coefficient. That is to say, for a hospital 
located in a Medicare expansion state, a one percent increase in the uninsured rate 
increases common sized profit by .45 percentage points. This effect is statistically 
significant at the 2% level with a p-value of p=0.015. This seems to conflict with the 
previous findings for the individual effects of uninsured rates and election of Medicare 
expansion, but this result has a logical rationale behind it, which will be discussed in the 
following Discussion section.  
 The Case Mix Index of a hospital has a large, positive impact on common sized 
profit. A one unit increase in Case Mix Index corresponds to a 2.72 percentage point 
increase in common sized profit. Considering the range of Case Mix Indexes measured, it 
is highly unlikely that a hospital could change their Case Mix Index by a full unit, so this 
full effect would likely not be observed year over year. This result is statistically 
significant at the 2% level.  
 As mentioned before, hospitals in the bottom 50% of TPS pay a fine and those in 
the top 50% receive a bonus. I hypothesized that this incentive tied to TPS would impact 
profitability by increasing profitability if a hospital was in the top 50% of scores. I found 
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that receiving the monetary bonus for being in the top 50% of scores does not have an 
effect on common sized profit. This did not support hypothesis 3(a). 
Examining the same characteristics effect on patient revenue, I found that for-
profit status means that a hospital will have patient revenue 108 million dollars more than 
non-profit status, supporting hypothesis 4(a). This is statistically significant at the 2% 
level and is consistent with the results from regression 5. Hypothesis 4(a) was also 
supported by the positive coefficient for the Medicare expansion variable. Hospitals 
located in a Medicare expansion state have patient revenues 319.75 million dollars more 
than hospitals not in expansion states. This effect is significant at the 5% level with a p-
value of p=0.042.  
The uninsured rate also has a positive impact on patient revenue, which does not 
support hypothesis 4(b). A one percent increase in the uninsured rate of a state leads to an 
increase in patient revenue of 40.72 million dollars. This is statistically significant with a 
p-value of p=0.001. The interaction variable between uninsured rate and Medicare 
expansion, while significant in the common sized profit regression, is not statistically 
significant in this regression.  
Case Mix Index has large impact on patient revenue. A one unit increase in CMI 
corresponds with an almost 588 million dollar increase in patient revenue. This supports 
the design of CMI as a method of calculating reimbursement for hospitals, and is 
statistically significant.  
Hypothesis 4(c) was not supported as I hypothesized that the presence of a 
hospital in the top 50% of TPS would not have an effect on patient revenue, but I found 
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that it does have a statistically significant impact. Hospitals in the top 50% of TPS have 
patient revenues 90.5 million dollars lower than hospitals in the bottom 50% of scores.  
 
Chapter 6. Discussion 
 
6.1 Effects on Quality 
As seen in the results for regressions 1-6, for-profit status has a negative impact 
on overall quality, and more specifically on Patient Experience and Cost Reduction. 
Using the logic of Picone et al. (2002) and Jha et al. (2008), the likely explanation behind 
for-profit’s negative impact on Patient Experience has to do with hospital staffing. Both 
studies found that non-profit hospitals tend to have higher employment rates than for-
profit hospitals. Hospital staff typically accounts for a large percentage of hospital costs, 
and can be seen as an area where costs can be cut. Cutting these costs could mean lower 
staff numbers or cutting down on employee training past what is required for the 
industry. Either of these methods of cutting costs could explain the worse scores for 
Patient Experience. Jha et al. (2008) found that hospitals with higher employment 
received better ratings from patients regarding discharge instructions, communication 
with nurses, and communication about medications. A reduced nursing staff means the 
nurses are responsible for more patients at any given time, which will lower the amount 
of time spent with each patient. This can reduce communication with the patient and thus 
lower Patient Experience ratings.  
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Even though Patient Experience scores are worse at for-profit hospitals, potential 
staff reductions don’t go as far as to negatively impact the survival rates or increase 
infection rates. This means there is a threshold above which more hospital staff can 
enhance patient experiences and below which can affect the quality of the treatment 
itself. Profit maximization doesn’t drive hospitals to cut staffing so much that patient 
outcomes are affected, which is reassuring to see. 
 The negative impact of for-profit status on the Cost Reduction and Efficiency 
score ties to profit maximization. Since higher scores in this domain correspond with 
lower costs for the patient, this negative impact makes sense. For-profit institutions are 
likely to charge higher prices than non-profits as part of their goal to maximize profits. 
Also in negotiations with insurance companies regarding rates, for-profit hospitals are 
more likely to negotiate the profit maximizing price which likely raises costs for the 
patient. Also in this regression, the interaction variable was statistically significant at the 
10% level. With a positive coefficient, this interaction variable is an interesting finding. 
Of for-profit hospitals, more profitable hospitals score better on Cost Reduction score. 
This may be due to these hospitals finding other revenue streams and passing on some 
savings to the patients through lower rates. Another possibility is these hospitals are 
extremely efficient with their care, and efficient processes save both the hospital and the 
patient money. Without more information, this is an interesting trend to note, and is 
worth looking into further. 
 The results from regression 6 tell us that even though there is a financial incentive 
to have higher quality, the bonus for high quality likely isn’t high enough to convince 
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hospitals to spend the money required to raise their Total Performance Score. Conversely, 
the fine for lower quality likely isn’t punitive enough to incentivize hospitals to try and 
raise their TPS. This would explain why for-profit hospitals are more likely to be in the 
bottom 50% of TPS.  
 
6.2 Drivers of Profitability 
The positive coefficient on the profit status variable was expected because for-
profit institutions are supposed to be more concern with earning a profit than non-profit 
institutions. Also as Garthwaite et al. 2018) explained, non-profit hospitals must provide 
community benefit in order to maintain tax-exempt status. One example of community 
benefit is providing uncompensated care to the uninsured, which cuts into profitability. 
Other community benefits also require financial investment, making giving non-profit 
hospitals an additional cost that for-profit hospitals do not deal with. An interesting 
extension would be to research further non-profit hospitals spending on community 
benefit to find out the most beneficial services non-profits provide, and which ones are 
most cost effective.  
 The impacts of uninsured rates and Medicare expansion are consistent with prior 
research of Garthwaite et al. (2018) and Selden et al. (2015). Both uninsured and 
Medicare patients often reimburse the hospital less than privately insured patients, so for 
the same treatments, these people are less profitable consumers of care. The presence of 
EMTALA however doesn’t allow for hospitals to refuse care for these patients if 
emergency treatment is needed. But as suggested by Garthwaite et al. (2018), for-profit 
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hospitals may adjust the quantity of care for these patients to minimize losses from these 
patients. The next extension would be to compare the amount of care given to patients for 
a certain condition at a non-profit hospital versus at a for-profit hospital, and make this 
comparison for each type of insurance: private, public, and uninsured. Not only would 
this give us information as to if hospitals tailor down quantity of care based on insurance, 
but would also give insight into the efficiency of hospital care for certain patients. This 
extension would have to control for patients having the same outcomes to reveal relevant 
trends in efficiency of care for certain patients. 
 The interesting result of this regression was the positive coefficient of the 
interaction variable between uninsured rate and election of Medicare expansion. From a 
strictly math perspective, this makes sense as both uninsured and Medicare expansion 
variables have negative coefficients so multiplying two negatives together gives a 
positive answer. There are two possible explanations to understand the underlying logic 
of this result. The first is that uninsured patients visit the hospital with only 8% of 
uninsured patients reporting an inpatient hospital visit in a survey conducted by 
Garthwaite et al. (2018). Thus in a state with Medicare expansion, where more of the 
population is covered by Medicare insurance, a higher uninsured population decreases the 
number of people visiting the hospital as lower paying patients, which would help 
profitability. The other explanation extends off of the research of Batty and Ippolito 
(2017). Fair pricing laws exist in a few states, capping the amount hospitals can charge 
uninsured patients, but they do not exist in most states. In the absence of these laws, for-
profit institutions can bill uninsured patients the list price of a procedure. Thus in a state 
with Medicare expansion and no fair pricing law, a higher uninsured rate means more 
40	
	
uninsured patients will visit the hospital and get billed the list prices instead of the 
Medicare negotiated rates. Anything the hospital is able to collect above the Medicare 
negotiated price increases the profitability of that patient.  
 The Case Mix Index variable was found to have the expected impact on common 
sized profit as it was designed to help determine relative reimbursement for different 
procedures. More complicated procedures will be given a higher relative weight and thus 
be reimbursed more than a less complicated procedure. A hospital has some control over 
their CMI, as they can choose to perform more complicated procedures. This would make 
for an interesting follow up research question, one which examined the changes in CMI 
year over year and how that related to the profitability of an individual hospital. There 
would be some noise due to external factors, but some of those can be controlled. This 
potential research would reveal some information regarding the thought process of 
hospital management regarding their view of hospital treatments offered as a way to 
increase financial success.  
 Finally, in this regression, the dummy variable for hospitals in the top 50% of 
TPS produced a result that was not statistically significant. This indicates that the 
financial benefit received for being in the top half of quality ratings is not a major factor 
in determining profitability. I had hypothesized it would positively impact profitability 
because it was a payment received outside of normal operations, but the non-impact it has 
says otherwise. This may result from significantly higher costs associated with increasing 
quality ratings. Potentially the benefits and fines associated with the median cutoff of 
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TPS would need to be increased to truly incentivize hospitals to increase quality, as then 
these benefits and fines would have a legitimate impact on profitability. 
 
6.3 Drivers of Patient Revenue 
 Similar to the reasoning behind the effect of profit status on profitability, for-
profit status has a positive impact on patient revenue. Through the negotiation of profit 
maximizing prices with insurance companies in addition to not always being subjected to 
fair pricing laws, for-profit hospitals are able to derive more revenue from patients. With 
more information, it would be an interesting study to investigate the difference in 
negotiated prices, and to compare by hospital location and by insurer. 
 In hypothesis 4(a), I stated that the election of Medicare expansion would have a 
positive impact on patient revenue and this hypothesis was supported by the results of 
regression 8. As Garthwaite et al. (2018) found, people without health insurance are 
highly unlikely to make hospital visits. Medicare expansion provides public health 
insurance to some of the uninsured population. With insurance coverage, people are more 
likely to take a hospital visit than when uninsured because they know that insurance will 
likely cover at least some of the medical bills. Thus the election of Medicare expansion 
increases the patient revenue of a hospital.  
 In hypothesis 4(b), I predicted that the uninsured rate would have a negative 
impact on patient revenue. This was not supported by the results of regression 8. 
Regression 8 showed that uninsured rate has a positive impact on patient revenue. While 
uninsured patients represent the vast majority of uncompensated care costs, they are still 
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billed for their medical care, and in the absence of fair pricing laws, they may be billed at 
the full list price for the treatment. This billing may lead to an increase in revenues 
because hospitals may be able to collect more from some of these patients than from 
insurance companies. An alternate explanation follows the study by Garthwaite et al. 
(2018). That study found that non-profit hospitals either do not pass on uncompensated 
care costs to insured patients, or are not good at passing along these costs. This doesn’t 
mean that for-profit hospitals have this same problem. For-profit hospitals already 
negotiate profit-maximizing prices with insurance companies, but this price may be 
higher in states with a higher uninsured rate, which effectively passes the uncompensated 
care costs to insured patients. This cost shifting can result in an increase in patient 
revenue with these higher revenues from insured patients plus whatever a hospital can 
collect from uninsured patients.   
 While both uninsured rate and Medicare expansion variables have positive 
coefficients for their individual impacts, the interaction variable between these two 
market characteristics has a negative coefficient. It is not statistically significant but is 
interesting to note. Further study is needed to see if this interaction is still not statistically 
significant in a larger sample, or with more localized uninsured rates.  
 As explained in section 6.2, Case Mix Index was implemented as a way to 
determine relative reimbursement for hospitals. Higher CMI results in more 
compensation, and seems like a fairly direct characteristic for hospitals to target if they 
want to increase patient revenues and profitability.  
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 Contrary to my hypotheses 3(a) and 4(c), a hospital’s presence in the top 50% of 
TPS did not impact profitability but did impact patient revenue. I predicted there would 
be no effect on patient revenue because the payment associated with being in the top 50% 
of TPS wouldn’t be considered patient revenue, but regression 8 showed that hospitals in 
the top 50% of TPS have over 90 million dollars less patient revenue than those in the 
bottom 50%. The likely explanation is that the hospitals in the top 50% of TPS received 
higher scores in the Cost Reduction domain, meaning they were better at cost reduction 
for the patient. These high marks in this domain would explain the lower patient revenues 
of these hospitals.  
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 Implications 
 Through the support found for hypotheses 2-4, with the exception of hypotheses 
3(a) and 4(b), the outcomes examined provide overall support for hypothesis 1(a). 
Supporting hypothesis 1(a), the effect of for profit status on the quality of care is overall 
negative, and more specifically negative with respect to customer experience and cost 
reduction for the patient. These two measures of quality represent the two measures in 
which management can make decisions regarding spending and revenues without 
affecting baseline care levels. The patients can experience varying levels of payments and 
customer satisfaction, but their outcomes will not be affected by these decisions. 
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Additionally, for-profit status has a positive impact on both profitability and patient 
revenue of the hospital. These are not be all end all financial measures, but they provide 
support for hypothesis 1(a) and insight into the managerial focus of for-profit hospitals. 
 On the comparison in hypothesis 1(a), non-profit status had a positive impact on 
the composite quality measure, and more specifically a positive impact on customer 
experience and cost reduction for the patient. The improvement of these quality measures 
over for-profit hospitals highlights the emphasis on higher quality care outside of the 
basics of care, such as survival and infection prevention, which supports part of 
hypothesis 1(a). Looking at the other half of the hypothesis, non-profit status had a 
negative effect on both patient revenue and profitability. This demonstrates the shift of 
the balance between performance in financial measures and quality measures from non-
profit hospitals to for-profit hospitals. Additionally, non-profit status makes the hospital 
more likely to be in the top 50% of Total Performance Scores, with which a monetary 
bonus is associated, yet this doesn’t impact profitability and hurts patient revenue. This 
shows no financial incentive to improving the aspects of quality that are positively 
affected by non-profit status.  
7.2 Avenues for Future Research 
Overall, the results demonstrate support for my hypotheses regarding a shift in the 
balance between financial performance and quality performance. More research is 
necessary in order to develop more complete support for these hypotheses. First, it would 
be worthwhile to track this sample over a span of time to capture the effect of market 
fluctuations on these emphases through the impact of the outcomes. It would also be a 
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good extension to gain access to fuller financial statements for the hospitals in this 
sample to examine the effects on other financial measures to garner further support for 
the hypotheses.  
 It would be an interesting expansion to evaluate these hypotheses and models for 
hospitals larger than those within my sample (hospitals with greater than 200 beds). 
These hospitals have different operating environments than the small hospitals I 
examined, often serve more diverse populations, and may offer a wider range of care 
specialties. This extension would provide information that speaks to the alignment or 
disconnect between managerial focus of large versus small for-profit or non-profit 
hospitals.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for variables included in OLS regressions. 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
TPS 247 40.89 11.16 11.88 66.75 
ClinicalCare 238 40.73 20.36 0 100 
PatientExperience 241 35.61 17.85 2 90 
SafetyScore 239 61.13 17.86 18 100 
CostRedScore 241 26.72 27.01 0 100 
TPS50 247 0.50 0.5 0 1 
CSprofit 247 1.92 3.64 -21.77 12.21 
patientrev 247 478.1603 373.9731 79.06553 2715.36 
profitstatus 247 0.45 0.50 0 1 
statusCSprofit 247 1.08 2.34 -4.71 12.21 
uninsured 247 8.30 3.07 2.50 16.60 
MedicareExpansion 247 0.56 0.49 0 1 
uninsuredXexpansion 247 3.73 3.78 0 14 
CMI 247 1.5113 0.21 1.1072 2.3335 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for hospital specific characteristics (non-profit hospitals). 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
TPS 136 43.59 10.73 18.81 66.5 
ClinicalCare 131 40.72 21.34 0 90 
PatientExperience 132 38.8 18.62 5 90 
SafetyScore 132 60.99 17.22 18 100 
CostRedScore 132 30.08 28.38 0 100 
TPS50 136 0.6 0.49 0 1 
CSprofit 136 1.52 4.05 -21.77 12.07 
patientrev 136 397.3023 297.6 79.06553 1871.637 
CMI 136 1.4875 0.17 1.1092 2.0925 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for hospital specific characteristics (for-profit hospitals). 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max 
TPS 111 37.59 10.81 11.88 66.75 
ClinicalCare 107 40.74 19.19 0 100 
PatientExperience 109 31.76 16.14 2 82 
SafetyScore 107 61.31 18.69 20 100 
CostRedScore 109 22.66 24.78 0 100 
TPS50 111 0.38 0.49 0 1 
CSprofit 111 2.4 3.01 -4.71 12.21 
patientrev 111 577.23 431.4 99.52667 2715.36 
CMI 111 1.5405 0.25 1.1072 2.3335 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Results from regressions (1)-(6) examining effects on quality of hospital care. 
Note that regression (6) is a logit regression, thus the R-Squared listed is actually the 
Pseudo R2. 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TPS 
 
Clinical 
Care 
Patient 
Experience 
Safety 
Score 
CostRed 
Score 
TPS50 
profitstatus -6.41*** 
(1.61) 
 
-0.46 
(3.10) 
 
-8.78*** 
(2.64) 
1.84 
(2.70) 
-10.89*** 
(4.02) 
-0.99*** 
(0.31) 
statusCSprofit 0.17 
(0.34) 
0.21 
(0.68) 
0.72 
(0.56) 
-0.64 
(0.58) 
1.43* 
(0.85) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
       
       
Observations 247 238 241 239 241 247 
R-Squared 0.0729 0.0004 0.0453 0.0053 0.0304 0.037 
F 9.59 0.05 5.65 0.63 3.73  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Results from regressions (7) and (8) examining effects on financial measures. 
Regression (7) (8) 
Variables CSprofit Patientrev 
profitstatus 0.82* 
(0.48) 
108.23** 
(43.77) 
uninsured -0.36*** 
(0.14) 
40.72*** 
(12.67) 
MedicareExpansion -4.65*** 
(1.71) 
319.75** 
(156.32) 
uninsuredXexpansion 0.45** 
(0.18) 
-19.03 
(16.98) 
CMI 2.72** 
(1.11) 
587.94*** 
(101.58) 
TPS50 0.26 
(0.47) 
-90.48** 
(42.98) 
   
Observations 247 247 
R-Squared 0.0687 0.2594 
F 2.95 14.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Results from regression (6) using the OLS method.  
Variable TPS50 
Profitstatus -0.24*** 
(0.07) 
statusCSprofit 0.01 
(0.02) 
  
Observations 247 
R-Squared 0.0508 
F 6.53 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
